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Abstract 
In this paper will be made a review of the literature giving information about the immobile                
bubble 'crush', taking as starting point the fall of the great american company Lehman              
Brothers, and the main causes will be discussed in order to have an overview of this global                 
crisis. Iceland was one of the European countries whose economy was most affected but              
also one of the fastest in recovering of it. With the analysis of some of the meters of the                   
economy and social welfare, such as the GDP, inflation, unemployment, average wage,            
public debt and public deficit; the data before the crisis will be compared with the data after                 
the crisis to see which economic measures took the government of this country to mitigate               
the damage of the 'crash' and see if the government responses were effective or not in order                 
to get conclusions. 
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 Lehman Brothers ‘crash’: Consequences on 
Iceland’s economy and social welfare 
 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
 
Before going into details about the great recession that took place in 2008 because of the                
explosion of the great immobile bubble, created over the years, and explain its disastrous              
consequences, it would be interesting to put ourselves in context. 
In this paper will be made a review of the literature giving information about the immobile                
bubble 'crush', taking as starting point the fall of the great american company called Lehman               
Brothers and the main causes will be discussed in order to have an overview of this global                 
crisis. 
 
After this, and focusing on the consequences in Iceland, will be analyzed the numerical data               
of some of the meters of the economy and social welfare, such as the GDP, inflation,                
unemployment, average wage, public debt and public deficit in Iceland. Moreover, the data             
before the crisis will be compared with the data after the crisis to see which economic                
measures took the government of this country to mitigate the damage of the 'crash' and see                
if the government responses were effective or not in order to get conclusions. 
 
Nowadays, fifty is the number of countries that make up the European continent. One of               
those countries is Iceland, located in northern Europe with capital in Reykjavik. It has              
103.000 Km² of surface but it’s density population is really low, specifically three people              
every Km².  
 
In many publications the consequences of the first economic and financial crisis of the 21st               
century have been analyzed from a numerical or a more social point of view. In this writing                 
both are going to be treated at the same time, together with the historical data. 
Although the consequences of this great economic and financial crisis reached all countries             
of the world, this paper is going to be focused on the causes and consequences in Iceland                 
since compared to the value of its economy, this country suffered the biggest crisis ever               
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 seen in the world. Now, Iceland is emerging from the economic crisis with amazing speed,               
taking into account all that they lost and the public debt that they accumulated. It is one of                  
the countries with less unemployed people in the world. On 2017 it had a GDP per capita of                  
61.700€ and as a consequence of this, its population has a really high average wage, having                
a good quality of life. 
But despite of all this many economists fear again for the economic situation of the country,                
since the rise in house prices has been during the last four years more than 10%, what                 
already exceeds the price levels before the great collapse that suffered ten years ago. In               
terms of tourism, which helped the country to get out of its bad situation ten years ago, it is                   
suffering a significant decline.  
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 2.LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC.: COMPANY HISTORY 
 
In its beginnings, the company started as a small store in Alabama, founded by Henry               
Lehman in 1844, then his brothers Mayer Lehman and Emanuel Lehman joined the             
company too, that is why they were called Lehman Brothers. 
 
When they opened, their main customers were the cotton farmers but they soon discovered              
that they could make much more money in another way. "Since the farmers often paid their                
bills in cotton, the brothers soon found that their business relied as much on selling cotton as                 
dry goods. Deciding to focus on trading cotton, in 1858 the brothers established a New York                
office and were instrumental in setting up the New York Cotton Exchange. The brothers also               
began trading other commodities, as well as helping companies raise capital in the bond and               
equity markets. In 1887, Lehman Brothers became a member of the New York Stock              
Exchange, establishing the company in securities trading and providing a foundation for the             
underwriting business" (Wiggins, Piontek and Metrick, 2014, p.3).  
 
As long as they were growing, they diversified their assets, investing in new businesses such               
as tobacco, the railway or coffee. And in this way Lehman Brothers grew even more. Later                
they also participated in television and radio business. "Lehman Brothers was an early             
backer of Radio Corporation of America (RCA) and National Broadcasting Corporation           
(NBC) and Robert Lehman also entered the television industry at an early stage" (Ingham,              
1983, p.786). After a couple of generations Lehman working in the company, it became an               
investment bank. 
 
Despite the fact that when Robert Lehman died, the company had some difficulties, in 1973               
it became a really important international company, recovered by expanding and opening            
new offices. This lasted until 1984, when Lehman Brothers merged with Shearson after             
being sold to American Express. At that time was called Shearson Lehman Brothers.  
After 1994, when Lehman Brothers became an independent company again, Dick Fuld            
started as a director and he did some changes in the business. In 1999, a change in the                  
american laws in the financial industry allowed deregulation in the sector. A law of regulatory               
nature called Glass- Steagall act. o more common the law of the banks was applied in                
United States after the crisis of 1929 in order to regulate the speculation of the banks,                
separating banking into two types of entities, investment banking and commercial banking.            
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 This law was repealed in 1999, which allowed banks to take more risks and trade with the                 
money. They started to work with innovative high risk products like derivatives and real              
estate, making them earn a lot of money which instead of giving income to the customers,                
just gave benefits to the company. As Rosalind Z., Wiggins et al. indicate in their article,                
during the first six years of the century, because of the last changes in the law, the company                  
grew up faster than its rivals, specifically they had an increase of 130% in their income. Then                 
they beat themselves, when Fuld was in charge, the company was in $2.7 billion in 1994 and                 
twelve years later, in 2006, was more than $19 billion that means that appreciated by 600%.                
During that same period of time, this was also reflected in the price of its shares in the stock                   
market which rose up by some 340%. 
 
Having all this positive data, it is hard to believe that things went wrong as it did it, thus                   
causing the bankruptcy that added to the bankruptcy of some more companies led to a great                
recession. Or maybe is all the opposite and it is just because of these facts that we can see                   
that things were not going as well as they seemed and maybe they were not doing                
something right.  
 
 
3.THE FALL OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 
 
"On September 15, Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. sought Chapter 11 protection, initiating            
the largest bankruptcy proceeding in United States (U.S.) history. It declared $639 billion in              
assets and $613 billion in debts" (Wiggins, Piontek and Metrick, 2014, p.2). 
At the time, the Lehmans' family company was considered one of the "too big too fail"                
companies. That means that the company was big enough to suppose to be rescued in case                
of bankruptcy, otherwise the consequences would be catastrophic not only for all the             
investors, for the entire economy. But this time the United States government did not try to                
save Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. (Wiggins, Piontek and Metrick, 2014, p. 2). 
 
Throughout the history of the United States one of the worst crises that has had to overcome                 
was the crack of 29 and the next forty years after that recession were free of crises, years of                   
prosperity and economic growth, everything was controlled by the government and the laws             
had regulated the economy of the country prohibiting the speculation. 
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 The system was basically formed by local banks, only some of the small private banks were                
operating with stock and bonus.  
This situation lasted until 1980 when the investment businesses started to operate with large              
quantities of stock and then they became public banks, everybody on Wall Street started to               
earn exorbitant amounts of money. One year later, in 1981, was when, with Regan              
administration, the real deregulation started and it continued also during the Clinton mandate             
until the financial sector get consolidated in few firms. This endangered the country’s             
economy, all power was in the hands of a few.  
 
The alliances and mergers created between financial companies and banks, what united            
almost the entire economic and financial system of the United States, made it more              
vulnerable to a possible failure that could cause them to fall one after the other. At the                 
beginning of the 90’s, a financial product called derivative was created by the financial              
entities in order to earn more money. Along with the derivatives appeared the possibility of               
betting in favor but also against anything. By the end of the 90s, derivatives were a huge                 
unregulated market, a huge bubble was being created by the internet stocks, that produced              
one more crisis in the US history, because of which the investment companies had losses               
worth trillion of dollars.  
 
After 2000, with a new law which prohibited the regulation of the derivatives, everything              
exploded. And one year later, the US industry was basically controlled by five banks, among               
which was Lehman Brothers, two financial conglomerates, three security insurance          
companies and three rating agencies; creating a strong block which connected billion            
dollars and a new system of loans. 
As described in detail in the documentary ‘Inside Job’, before the deregulation the lenders              
lent the money and they expected to have it back in long-term, that is why the lenders did                  
not lend the money to everybody, they had to make sure that the money was returned to                 
them, they had the risk of unpaid debt . But in the new way to lend money, when the client                    
paid the mortgages, the money went to the investors, the risk was divided in many pieces                
and could be all over the world. The lenders could sell the mortgage to investment banks,                
who added to this mortgages other financial products in order to created something new and               
can sell it. This is what is usually called derivatives or CDO. In the last step, this derivatives                  
were sold to investors. 
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 At the same time, the investment banks, paid to the rating agencies and got the best                
qualification possible for their products, AAA, what gave investors confidence and           
encouraged them to invest more. The lenders did not take any risk, so they did not mind if                  
the debtors could or not pay.  
 
The prices of the houses increased considerably since it was very easy to get a mortgage                
cause the banks did not have any risk so they were lending without ask. People were buying                 
more and more houses and selling them for a much better price, by the time, the importance                 
of the leverage in the financial companies was growing fast. That is how was created the                
housing bubble.  
 
At the same time, AIG, an important insurance company over the world was trading with               
another products derivatives. For them the businesses was in sell to the people that              
previously had CDO, credit default insurance. If in the end the CDO went bad, this new                
product could ensure that the investor had back the lost money. And besides that the               
company was also selling credit defaults against the CDO.  
 
Soon, people started to owe a lot of money to the banks since they could not pay the                  
mortgages and at some point even the companies, like Lehman Brothers, which were             
creating and selling the CDO, were betting on its failure. 
The fact that they bet against their own products makes think about the responsibility of               
Lehman Brothers and others and their implication on this disastrous recession. 
 
As previously stated, the changes in the law, promoting the deregulation, were an essential              
cause of the crisis in Iceland but that was not the only factor that caused banks to grow                  
above their means. The low interests rates also boosted investors with the support of the               
rating agencies . 
 
“During the early years of the 21st century, the situation on the global financial markets was                
highly unusual. The supply of credit was virtually inexhaustible and interest rates lower than              
they had been in a hundred years. Financial markets were hungry for bonds, including those               
issued by Iceland’s banks, which were a welcome addition to many of the structured              
securities that became so popular. The banks were thoroughly scrutinised by international            
rating agencies and their favourable credit ratings greatly facilitated the banks’ foray into the              
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 bond market. The banks became a vital link in the national economy, their expansion and               
that of other Icelandic companies garnered widespread support, they offered handsome           
salaries, and they paid the Treasury sizeable tax revenues, directly and indirectly. 
Until that time, the banks had increasingly been active in the global bond market, with ever                
larger debt issues” (Fridriksson, 2009, p. 3). 
 
“One of the side effects of the dramatic developments in the global financial markets starting               
in mid-2007 was the sharp rise in risk aversion among investors and the rapidly shrinking               
supply of credit. CDS spreads began rising, including those of Icelandic banks. Global             
market conditions continued to deteriorate throughout 2007: share prices plummeted,          
access to credit became much more limited, and interbank business transactions more            
complicated at best” (Fridriksson, 2009, p.3). 
 
 
 
4.CONSEQUENCES FOR ICELAND 
 
As already noted above, in United States a new way of doing politics that promoted the                
deregulation of economic and financial operations by investors, banks and other types of             
financial entities, made possible the creation of a huge housing bubble driven by             
speculation.  
For Iceland was not so different, after privatizing the banking sector in 2000 the icelandic               
banks began an important expansion around europe, trading with assets and liabilities, what             
would bring consequences of extraordinary magnitudes. The Icelandic government         
privatized the three largest banks and allowed multinational to exploit the country’s natural             
energy sources without any control. 
 
Since then and for the next years, three of the banks in the country borrowed 120.000 million                 
of dollars, without had never done any business outside Iceland. Then the amount due was               
ten times the size of the value of Iceland’s economy.  
Many people started to borrow from Icelandic banks thousands of dollars, even millions to              
use for themselves with no control. At the same time the banks created new money market                
funds and they tried to convince to the citizens that the best option was withdraw deposits                
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 and invest it in those funds. But for the agencies which worked as auditors of this                
companies, apparently, there was any problem with the new funds and the interests rates on               
bank loans. They affirmed that everything was clear and the risk of new products and               
investments, even with an increasing indebtedness rate, was minimum. 
 
“After Iceland’s banks were fully privatised early this century, they began expanding at a              
rapid pace, with the primary focus of that growth outside Iceland. They acquired financial              
companies in other countries, opened branches, and expanded their international business           
from their headquarters in Reykjavík” (Fridriksson, 2009, p. 1). 
They grew and became indebted above their means, taking into account that Iceland is a               
really small country with a population of just over 300.000 inhabitants in that moment.  
 
“With the easy flow of borrowed foreign capital at low interest rates, the economy had ample                
resources for rapid growth, which soon turned into an excessive speculation bubble”            
(Ólafsson, 2013, p. 107). 
 
The three main banks in the country went bankrupt after accumulating huge amounts of              
short- term debt, they were growing at a phenomenal speed getting more and more debt and                
selling it to other european countries. Probably the main cause of the failure was the               
inflation, for Jon Danielsson, the inflation in Iceland used to be higher than in other European                
countries and as a cause of it also the interests rates, which made much more interesting to                 
buy debt. “The original reasons for Iceland’s failure are series of policy mistakes dating back               
to the beginning of the decade. The first main cause of the crisis was the use of inflation                  
targeting. Throughout the period of inflation targeting, inflation was generally above its target             
rate. In response, the central bank kept rates high, exceeding 15% at times. 
In a small economy like Iceland, high interest rates encourage domestic firms and             
households to borrow in foreign currency; it also attracts carry traders speculating against             
‘uncovered interest parity’. The result was a large foreign currency inflow. This lead to a               
sharp exchange rate appreciation that gave Icelanders an illusion of wealth and doubly             
rewarding the carry traders. The currency inflows also encouraged economic growth and            
inflation; outcomes that induced the Central Bank to raise interest rates further. The end              
result was a bubble caused by the interaction of high domestic interest rates, currency              
appreciation, and capital inflows. While the stylized facts about currency inflows suggest that             
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 they should lead to lower domestic prices, in Iceland the impact was opposite” (Danielsson,              
2008, p.9). 
 
With this economic situation in a special context as was the Lehman Brothers crash and its                
subsequent crisis in United States, the financial markets around the world became unstable,             
getting into a global crisis. The economies of the whole world were falling one by one as if it                   
were a domino and also the Icelandic. 
 
“Adding to this the peculiar governance structure of the Central Bank of Iceland. Uniquely, it               
does not have one but three governors. One or more of those has generally been a former                 
politician. Consequently, the governance of the Central Bank of Iceland has always been             
perceived to be closely tied to the central government, raising doubts about its             
independence. Currently, the chairman of the board of governors is a former long-standing             
Prime Minister. Central bank governors should of course be absolutely impartial, and having             
a politician as a governor creates a perception of politicization of central bank decisions”              
(Danielsson, 2008, p. 10). 
 
In relation to the impact that the politics may have had on Iceland’s economic situation,               
Ólafsson points as the main cause the neoliberal current of thought that began to develop in                
the country during the 1980’s, which limited the intervention of the state in economic and               
legal matters.  
 
The consequences were catastrophic for Iceland, a country that was at the top with its               
economy and quality of life of its inhabitants, after the crisis in the banking sector the                
government did not have enough funds to support, the value of their debts were too big.  
“Before the crisis, the Icelandic banks had foreign assets worth around 10 times the              
Icelandic GDP, with debts to match. In this crisis, the strength of a bank’s balance sheet is of                  
little consequence. What matters is the explicit or implicit guarantee provided by the state to               
the banks to back up their assets and provide liquidity. Therefore, the size of the state                
relative to the size of the banks becomes the crucial factor. If the banks become too big to                  
save, their failure becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. The relative size of the Icelandic             
banking system means that the government was in no position to guarantee the banks,              
unlike in other European countries. This effect was further escalated and the collapse             
brought forward by the failure of the Central Bank to extend its foreign currency reserves.               
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 The final collapse was brought on by the bankruptcy of almost the entire Icelandic banking               
system” (Danielsson, 2008, p. 11). 
 
 
4.1.Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and inflation after the crisis 
 
The GDP or Gross Domestic Product is one of the main indicators of the economy of a                 
country or region, since it measures the wealth of a country. It calculates the activity carried                
out during a certain period of time, normally one year, within the country. That means that                
knowing this indicator can give you a rough idea about the value of that economy or the                 
value that the economy created during that period.  
To measure this indicator some parameters have to be known, such as consumption (C ),               
which is the personal consumption of goods and services; investment (I), that picks up the               
private investment; public or government spending (G); and imports (M) and exports (X) or              
what is the same, net exports, this last category includes the consumption of goods and               
services produced outside the country and goods and services produced within the country             
but consumed outside it. 
With the disponibility of all this information it is possible to calculate the Gross Domestic               
Product. The most common way to calculate it is using the following formula:  
 
GDP = C + I + G + (X - M) 
 
The Gross Domestic Product that most often interests both economists and politicians in a              
nation is the GDP per capita or what is the same, the sum of all the goods and services                   
produced by each person in the country, since it gives a more approximate view of the                
situation in which the economy is. 
 
In the following data table, are shown the annual Gross Domestic Product at market prices in                
million of euros (GDP), the GDP growth rate at constant prices in percentage (GDP annual               
Var. (%)), the GDP per capita in euros (GDP per capita) and the growth rate of the GDP per                   
capita in percentage (GDP per capita annual Var. (%)) during a period of time between 1995                
and 2017.  
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 It is interesting to analyze the data of this period since it includes some years in which the                  
growth of the Icelandic was huge, before the crisis, and some years in which, during the                
housing bubble crash, the country suffered a great recession. Then, the period after the              
crisis until now is going to show how the country’s economy prospers by recovering from it. 
 
 
Table 1.​GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth rates in Iceland between 1995 and 2017 
Year GDP GDP annual Var. (%) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per 
capita annual 
Var. (%) 
1995 5.361M.€ 0,10% 20.000€ 0,50% 
1996 5.758M.€ 4,80% 21.400€ 7,00% 
1997 6.654M.€ 7,00% 24.600€ 15,00% 
1998 7.527M.€ 7,00% 27.500€ 11,80% 
1999 8.358M.€ 3,90% 30.100€ 9,50% 
2000 9.670M.€ 4,60% 34.400€ 14,30% 
2001 9.068M.€ 3,90% 31.800€ -7,60% 
2002 9.793M.€ 0,60% 34.100€ 7,20% 
2003 10.018M.€ 2,40% 34.600€ 1,50% 
2004 11.054M.€ 8,10% 37.800€ 9,30% 
2005 13.438M.€ 6,40% 45.400€ 20,10% 
2006 13.634M.€ 5,00% 44.800€ -1,30% 
2007 15.584M.€ 9,40% 50.000€ 11,60% 
2008 10.798M.€ 1,70% 33.800€ -32,40% 
2009 9.269M.€ -6,50% 29.000€ -14,20% 
2010 10.051M.€ -3,60% 31.600€ 9,00% 
2011 10.583M.€ 2,00% 33.200€ 5,10% 
2012 11.122M.€ 1,30% 34.700€ 4,50% 
2013 11.699M.€ 4,30% 36.100€ 4,00% 
2014 13.048M.€ 2,20% 39.900€ 10,50% 
2015 15.277M.€ 4,30% 46.200€ 15,80% 
2016 18.362M.€ 7,50% 54.700€ 18,40% 
2017 21.193M.€ 3,60% 61.700€ 12,80% 
Source: Table adapted from datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018.  
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 Graphic 1.​GDP per capita in euros 2004-2017 per quarters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
 
 
It is possible to appreciate, both in the table and in the graph that the Icelandic economy did                  
not stop to grow between 1995 and 2007, at the beginning the growth was progressive, but                
in some point between 2004 and 2007 started to rise incredibly faster, especially in 2005               
when the GDP per capita increased 20,10% compared to the previous year. 
The maximum level reached in Iceland before the crisis was between July and September              
2007, the GDP this year was 15.584 million of euros, the GDP per capita, 50.000€. The                
economic level of the country arrived a really good levels and the welfare was considered               
excellent. The GDP absolute value in Iceland increased 1.950 million euros from 2006 to              
2007, that is a growth of 9,4% respect the value in 2006. But the most striking thing is the                   
change that occurs with the GDP per capita, which goes from being 31.800€ in 2001 to                
50.000€ in 2007. That is the time in which the banking sector was using its freedom caused                 
by the deregulation to grow faster than ever before. The housing bubble was growing and in                
2007 was almost to explode. 
 
As the table and the graphic with the dates in quarters show, there is a serious drop in the                   
Gross Domestic Product between the third quarter in 2007 and the end of 2008. 
Go to annexes to see the table number 2, data table of GDP and GDP per capita with the                   
growth rates per quarters. 
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 In 2004 was proclaimed one of the most indebted country as a percentage of its GDP.                
Already in 2008, the comparison in Iceland between GDP and external debt was             
devastating, the debt was eight times the size of the country’s economy, something that has               
never happened in history. As Ólaffson and Danielsson point out, on 7 October there was a                
collapse in the transfer of money between Iceland and other foreign countries. ​“The financial              
system as a whole came almost to a standstill. The collapse was multidimensional. It started               
as a fall in the stock market that gathered momentum from the autumn of 2007, and as a                  
depreciation of the national currency (Icelandic krona) that started in the last two months of               
2007, gathering speed towards the spring of 2008. Then the currency stabilized during the              
summer. When the banks fell in October the currency took another large dive; altogether it               
fell by close to 50 percent from peak to trough” (Ólafsson, 2013, p. 107). 
“The Icelandic payment system effectively came to a standstill, with extreme difficulties in             
transferring money between Iceland and abroad. For an economy as dependent on imports             
and exports as Iceland this has been catastrophic” (Danielsson, 2008, p. 9). 
 
The GDP per capita decreased in 32,40% in 2008, and in 2009 was in the same level than in                   
1999, ten years ago, what means that the level of the Icelandic economy backed a decade.                
That was the magnitude of the recession.  
 
Now, with all this data, and knowing that the GDP is composed by consumption, investment,               
government spending and trade balance, we can guess what changed. The whole economy             
retracted; first the mortgages were not paid, so the banking sector was losing money and the                
investors withdraw the funds because of the uncertainty that this caused. On the other hand               
the consumption dropped considerably, caused by the increase of unemployment. The trade            
with other countries also decreased.  
 
Everybody, also the government had debt and nobody could pay, so the money loses were               
huge for all the sectors. But for the housing sector, the housing bubble ‘crash’ was specially                
negative. In a speculating context in which people was buying and selling houses every              
minute and with high rates of prices, the construction sector was growing fast and investig a                
lot of money. It was one of the most affected sectors along with the banking sector. 
 
In terms of inflation, as is represented in the following graphic, which shows the consumer               
price index in a period of fourteen years, the change before and after the fall of the financial                  
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 system, in the consumer price index was drastic. Taking as a turning point the year 2009,                
you can see how the prices level increased in a spectacular way from 2008 to 2009. The                 
housing bubble was growing at the same pace as prices did, above all the prices of housing.                 
“The consumption level of 2007–2008, at the height of the bubble economy, was             
unsustainable given the overrated currency value at that time and the role of borrowed              
money as a source of consumption in some cases” (Ólafsson, 2013, p.119).  
 
After the rupture of the housing bubble the consumer price index decreased, and did not               
stop until mid 2011. At its lowest point, prices reached levels similar to those of 2004,                
Icelandic economy was receding in the time. In spite of that, in 2012 there was another                
increase, although with a magnitude not comparable to that of the years 2008-2009, and as               
a result of which the Icelandic population could buy less goods or services than before the                
crisis having the same money. That is, its purchasing power declined with the increase in               
consumer prices. 
 
Nowadays, the consumer price index still as low as was after the depression. 
 
 
Graphic 2. ​Consumer price index between 2004 and 2017 in Iceland 
Source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
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 4.2. Unemployment and average wage after the crisis  
 
The amount or percentage of employees or unemployed people is another measurer of the              
value of an economy and the well-being of its population. This parameter just includes the               
people within age to be able to work which wants to work and are looking for a job but does                    
not find it. The unemployment is really useful when it comes to a study in which you are                  
making a comparison of the economy over time to identify any drastic change and what is                
causing it.  
 
In the following table is shown, in a period of fourteen years, since 2004 to 2017, the                 
thousands of persons unemployed, the percentage of unemployed people of total population            
and the percentage of unemployed people of active population. 
 
 
Table 3. ​Unemployed people, percentage of total population and active population 2004- 2017 
TIME/UNIT Thousand persons 
Percentage of 
total 
population 
Percentage of 
active 
population 
2004 5 2,4 3,1 
2005 4 2,1 2,6 
2006 5 2,3 2,9 
2007 4 1,9 2,3 
2008 6 2,4 3 
2009 13 5,8 7,2 
2010 14 6,1 7,6 
2011 13 5,6 7,1 
2012 11 4,8 6 
2013 10 4,3 5,4 
2014 9 4 5 
2015 8 3,3 4 
2016 6 2,5 3 
2017 6 2,3 2,8 
Source: ec.europa.eu/eurostat, 2018. 
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Graphic 3.​Percentages of unemployed people in Iceland between 2004 and 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration. Data source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
 
The graphic represents the percentages of unemployed people on the total population in             
Iceland, in blue, and on the active population, in red. The dates of the graphic are between                 
2004 and 2017.  
 
Using the numeric dates that the previous table and graphic contribute is easy to see in a                 
more graphic mode the changes in the number of people employed and unemployed before              
and after the crisis in Iceland. 
 
Until 2008 the unemployed people rate in Iceland was very low, arousing the envy of other                
European countries and increasing the quality of life of Icelandic citizens. In 2007, before the               
crisis just 1,9% of the population was unemployed, 2,3% of the active population, or what is                
the same four thousand people. The change between 2007 and 2010 was drastic, the              
unemployment rate of active population grew until 7,6% more than tripling the levels in 2007. 
 
However, after the bad levels of unemployment found in 2009 and later, Iceland recovers              
with some speed, lowering its unemployment rate year after year until 2017, when the level               
of unemployment was almost as good as it was in 2006, before the crisis. 
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 This was so thanks to the policies that the government took immediately after the drastic               
changes suffered by its economy. Above all, Ólafsson, points out that the policies that most               
helped to regulate unemployment were those of redistribution of expenses, giving greater            
importance to social expenditures such as unemployment benefits or aid to households.            
“The government aimed to increase equality in the distribution of levels of living, to soften the                
blow to the living standards of the nation, to reduce unemployment, and to soften the worst                
debt burden of households, as far as governmental finances allowed (...) on the whole social               
protection expenditures increased by 4.2 per cent in real value kronur from 2007 to 2010,               
with an increase of 11.6 percent for transfers to households, while expenditures on services              
were cut by nearly 3 per cent in the same period. Expenditures on pension benefits were                
increased by a generous raising of the minimum pension. Of course expenditures on             
unemployment benefits increased massively (by some 600 per cent) and expenditure on            
labour market measures increased by 60 per cent in real terms” (Ólafsson, 2013, p.114). 
 
Table 4. ​Average wage between 2004 and 2017 in Iceland 
Date Average wage 
2004 41.313€ 
2005 52.921€ 
2006 52.370€ 
2007 57.925€ 
2008 37.878€ 
2009 29.397€ 
2010 32.466€ 
2011 34.551€ 
2012 37.821€ 
2013 38.128€ 
2014 44.210€ 
2015 50.858€ 
2016 62.533€ 
2017 73.781€ 
Source: datosmacro/expansion.com, 2018. 
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 Regarding the salary, in the previous table, table number 5, is shown the average wage in                
euros between 2004 and 2017.  
Nowadays, Iceland is one of the European countries with the highest average salary per              
person, the data of wages in this country had always been really positive for its inhabitants                
and have indicated an advanced, strong and growing economy.  
 
As is represented in the previous table, from 2004 to 2007 the average wage was growing                
progressively. Nevertheless, from 2007 to 2008 the average wage decreased more than            
20.000€, going from 57.925€ of salary per person to 37.878€, and it continued falling until               
2009, when arrived to 29.397€. That was a decline that brought the average salary to levels                
even lower than there were in 2001.  
 
Despite of this, in 2010 the salary started to increase again, and has been increasing since                
then, faster every year. In numerous analyzes, such as Ólafsson’s, the degree of recovery of               
this economic indicator has already been classified as surprising, last year the average wage              
was 73.781€ per person, if it is divided for example in twelve pays, is more than 6.000€ per                  
month, what knowing the level of prices and the value of their currency is a good level. 
“Increase from 2011 to 2012 was about 4.6 per cent. That increase was in effect larger than                 
any yearly real wage increase in Iceland since 1998. It was in fact the highest yearly rise in                  
13 years. These figures clearly indicate the strength of the recovery” (Ólafsson, 2013,             
p.118). 
 
Among others, one of the main causes of this miraculous recovery is due to a group of                 
measures to change the economic situation of the country and that were aimed mainly at               
increasing social welfare. “In Iceland in 2009 minimum pensions were increased by 20 per              
cent and minimum wages were raised marginally, as were welfare benefits, which also             
became more targeted at the lowest income groups. The changes in the taxation system in               
effect lowered the real tax burden on lower income groups and increased the tax burden on                
the higher groups. The increased tax burden primarily fell on the top 40 per cent of                
households. Hence redistribution was a prominent feature of the Icelandic crisis strategy”            
(Ólafsson, salario, 2013, p. 112). 
 
Something that also helped was the tourist boom that the country has experienced since              
2010, when the volcano Eyjafjallajokul erupted.  
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4.3. Public deficit and public debt after the crisis 
 
In economics deficit is understood when, in an specific period of time, the expenditure of the                
state, that is, the public expenditure exceeds its income. Is the negative result of the state                
accounts due to income through taxes on citizens and other types of income, lower than               
expenses in subsidies and other goods and services. 
 
In the next numeric table appear the deficit in million of euros and the deficit as a percentage                  
of the GDP in Iceland between 2004 and 2017.  
 
 
Table 5. ​Public deficit in million of euros and as a percentage of the GDP, 2004-2017 
Year Deficit (M.€) Deficit (%GDP) 
2004 -36 -0,30% 
2005 602 4,50% 
2006 799 5,90% 
2007 765 4,90% 
2008 -1.407 -13,00% 
2009 -893 -9,60% 
2010 -977 -9,70% 
2011 -589 -5,60% 
2012 -414 -3,70% 
2013 -214 -1,80% 
2014 -10 -0,10% 
2015 -124 -0,80% 
2016 2.308 12,60% 
2017 321 1,50% 
Source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018.  
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Graphic 4.​ Public deficit evolution as a percentage of the GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
 
As is shown in the previous table and graphic, the deficit in Iceland is represented as a                 
percentage of the GDP, that is how is possible to know the real importance of it in the                  
Icelandic economy. When the data appears in positive, will be surplus instead of deficit.  
 
The fluctuation between deficit and surplus in Icelandic economy has been moving always,             
like usually in all economies. But there is a change before the crisis, when the banking                
sector was growing and apparently everything was going well, in 2007, there was a surplus               
with a value of 4,9% of the GDP, 765 million euros. Those were really good statistics for the                  
country if you do not take into account what came after.  
Between 2007 and 2008, the public accounts in Iceland came to have a deficit at worrying                
levels. The quantity of deficit was the 13% of the Gross Domestic Product in 2008, 1.407                
million euros. 
 
Despite of this in 2009 a slow recovery begins to be seen, which accelerates with the                
passage of time and from 2015 to 2016 a drastic change is recorded, having in 2016 a                 
superavit of 2.300 million of euros and coinciding with the finalization of the payment of its                
debt with the IMF.  
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In terms of public debt, Iceland, despite of its small size in terms of inhabitants, accumulated                
million of euros of debt. The banking system increased to such level and accumulated such               
level of debt that the rescue by the IMF, International Monetary Fund, had to be huge.  
The following table provides data on Icelandic debt from 2004 and 2017 in million of euros,                
as a percentage of the GDP and the debt per capita.  
 
Table 6. ​Debt in million of euros, debt as a percentage of the GDP and debt per capita, 2004- 2017 
Year Total debt (M.€) Debt (%GDP) 
Debt per 
capita 
2004 3.643 32,73% 12.411€ 
2005 3.586 26,00% 11.956€ 
2006 3.502 27,90% 11.381€ 
2007 4.057 28,50% 12.861€ 
2008 2.925 70,40% 9.157€ 
2009 7.322 87,90% 23.053€ 
2010 9.286 93,00% 29.160€ 
2011 10.184 99,10% 31.867€ 
2012 9.693 96,40% 30.117€ 
2013 9.874 81,79% 30.319€ 
2014 10.654 79,73% 32.374€ 
2015 10.315 66,00% 31.021€ 
2016 9.678 52,75% 28.603€ 
Source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
 
The graphic number five is in connection with the previous table and allows to see in a more                  
graphic way the debt as a percentage of the GDP of this country in a longer period of time. 
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Graphic 5. ​Public debt in Iceland as a percentage of the GDP, 1985-2016  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: datosmacro.expansion.com, 2018. 
 
In November 2008 Iceland asked for a bailout of the IMF, the agreement they reached was                
worth 2.100 million euros. It is the first developed country to request assistance from the IMF                
in 30 years. Was in that time when the public debt of Iceland lift that way, and was the same                    
debt the one that had been paying during eight years. Between 2008 and 2009, the debt                
doubled. Went up from 2.925 to 7.322 million euros. 
 
In other papers such as Ólafsson or Fridriksson, the subject of the weight of a country’s debt                 
in times of crisis is discussed. Ólafsson, for example, points out that the creation of the                
bubble is influenced by many factors and among them the housing sector does not stand out                
as the main cause. On the contrary, he highlights the importance of the debt accumulation               
that the country had for years and specially before the ‘crash’ and the growing speculation.               
Also qualifies the policies carried out for the return of the debt very appropriate and effective. 
“On the eve of the collapse, Iceland’s foreign debt amounted to almost eight times the               
country’s GDP. Most harmful in the case of Iceland was the debt accumulation of the               
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 financiers and business speculators who were responsible for the big majority of foreign             
debts” (Ólafsson, 2013, p. 120). 
Finally, thanks to the policies of reorganization of expenses, aid and taxes, in 2015 they               
managed to repay the debt and in advance to the proposed dates.  
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 5.CONCLUSIONS 
 
After years of neoliberalism policies in Iceland that began to take hold after the 70’s, the                
country was plunged into a major crisis that affected both politically and financially as well as                
socially. This happened in 2008 when the bubble which has been created in previous years               
explode.  
 
At the same time, in United States, a global economic crisis began in September 2008, when                
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, one of the most important banks in the US, and the fall                 
of the largest insurance company in the world, AIG, unleashed a global recession and the               
first global crisis of this century. 
The consequences were serious internationally, but especially in Iceland the fall of the             
banking, financial and economic sector was huge. And is that Iceland was one of the               
European countries best positioned in terms of the welfare state in concerned, which means              
that GDP per capita was at a level higher than the European average, as well as its very low                   
unemployment rate and its almost nonexistent public deficit. 
 
When, due to a series of deregulation policies carried out, the size of the Icelandic banking                
sector grew beyond its possibilities, surpassing its value to that of the country’s GDP and               
being impossible to be rescued by the state in case of financial collapse; the huge bubble                
explode. The new financial products created by the bank, like the subprime mortgages, to              
obtain more profit did not take into account the risks and when the system failed around the                 
world, the country’s debt increased rapidly. The government could not do anything to prevent              
the entire country from plunging into a crisis. 
From 2008 to 2009, the unemployment rate quadrupled, going from 2% to reach 9%, on the                
other hand, the GDP was reduced by 10%. 
 
In spite of this great blow, it has been seen how Iceland has been able to apply the correct                   
policies to mitigate the effects of the crisis and come out afloat, specially using social               
policies. Which instead of further sinking the country as sometimes is believed, boosted             
consumption and with it production and the economy up; making a renewal in the distribution               
of subsidies and grants, as well as in taxes.  
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 In this paper has been showed numerically and graphically, how the Icelandic economy has              
recovered of the crisis so fast compared to other countries that are still trying to get out. All                  
this, trying to give an explanation about it, analyzing some policies carried out and their               
positive effects . In the future it would be interesting to compare the measures carried out in                 
Iceland after the crisis with those carried out in other countries that were equally affected by                
the crisis, as it is something that this paper did not study.  
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 7. ANNEXES 
 
Table 2.​ GDP, GDP per capita and GDP growth rates in quarters in Iceland between 2004 and 2017 
Year Quarter GDP GDP Quarterly Var. (%) 
GDP per 
capita 
GDP per capita 
Quarterly Var. 
(%) 
2004 I 2.678M.€ 5,00% 9.215€ 9,00% 
2004 II 2.670M.€ -0,30% 9.188€ -0,30% 
2004 III 2.788M.€ 2,60% 9.595€ 4,40% 
2004 IV 2.905M.€ 3,50% 9.894€ 3,10% 
2005 I 3.088M.€ -3,10% 10.518€ 6,30% 
2005 II 3.243M.€ 5,50% 11.048€ 5,00% 
2005 III 3.474M.€ 2,70% 11.833€ 7,10% 
2005 IV 3.711M.€ -0,50% 12.373€ 4,60% 
2006 I 3.585M.€ -1,50% 11.953€ -3,40% 
2006 II 3.191M.€ 4,40% 10.641€ -11,00% 
2006 III 3.331M.€ 0,20% 11.106€ 4,40% 
2006 IV 3.544M.€ 0,10% 11.517€ 3,70% 
2007 I 3.598M.€ 3,20% 11.695€ 1,50% 
2007 II 3.954M.€ 4,80% 12.851€ 9,90% 
2007 III 4.026M.€ 0,40% 13.086€ 1,80% 
2007 IV 3.995M.€ 3,80% 12.663€ -3,20% 
2008 I 3.497M.€ -2,30% 11.085€ -12,50% 
2008 II 3.189M.€ -0,40% 10.108€ -8,80% 
2008 III 3.073M.€ -0,80% 9.743€ -3,60% 
2008 IV 1.612M.€ 1,70% 5.049€ -48,20% 
2009 I 2.460M.€ -7,60% 7.703€ 52,60% 
2009 II 2.309M.€ 4,50% 7.228€ -6,20% 
2009 III 2.214M.€ -0,30% 6.931€ -4,10% 
2009 IV 2.254M.€ -3,20% 7.095€ 2,40% 
2010 I 2.255M.€ -3,90% 7.099€ 0,10% 
2010 II 2.499M.€ 2,70% 7.867€ 10,80% 
2010 III 2.576M.€ -1,10% 8.110€ 3,10% 
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 2010 IV 2.690M.€ 1,00% 8.448€ 4,20% 
2011 I 2.538M.€ -1,10% 7.971€ -5,70% 
2011 II 2.553M.€ 2,00% 8.017€ 0,60% 
2011 III 2.687M.€ 2,20% 8.437€ 5,20% 
2011 IV 2.754M.€ -1,70% 8.618€ 2,10% 
2012 I 2.658M.€ 1,00% 8.317€ -3,50% 
2012 II 2.651M.€ -0,80% 8.297€ -0,30% 
2012 III 2.938M.€ 1,70% 9.193€ 10,80% 
2012 IV 2.806M.€ -1,20% 8.717€ -5,20% 
2013 I 2.719M.€ 4,80% 8.447€ -3,10% 
2013 II 2.902M.€ -3,50% 9.016€ 6,70% 
2013 III 2.974M.€ 3,60% 9.240€ 2,50% 
2013 IV 2.984M.€ 1,30% 9.161€ -0,90% 
2014 I 2.964M.€ -2,20% 9.101€ -0,70% 
2014 II 3.119M.€ 0,20% 9.576€ 5,20% 
2014 III 3.360M.€ 5,30% 10.318€ 7,70% 
2014 IV 3.407M.€ -2,40% 10.352€ 0,30% 
2015 I 3.539M.€ 0,10% 10.753€ 3,90% 
2015 II 3.701M.€ 3,70% 11.246€ 4,60% 
2015 III 3.735M.€ 0,70% 11.349€ 0,90% 
2015 IV 4.127M.€ 0,90% 12.410€ 9,40% 
2016 I 4.158M.€ 0,20% 12.503€ 0,80% 
2016 II 4.416M.€ 3,90% 13.281€ 6,20% 
2016 III 4.889M.€ 3,70% 14.702€ 10,70% 
2016 IV 5.348M.€ 2,20% 15.807€ 7,50% 
2017 I 5.270M.€ -1,70% 15.575€ -1,50% 
2017 II 5.519M.€ -0,80% 16.311€ 4,70% 
2017 III 5.424M.€ 3,90% 16.031€ -1,70% 
2017 IV 5.477M.€ 0,00% 15.719€ -2,00% 
Source: Own elaboration. Data source: datosmacro/expansion.com, 2018. 
30 
